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ABSTRACT
The production of prison is assumed to be a humane, reformist, and a radical step toward
rooting out corporal punishments. Contrary to the common assumption, this study shows how
liberal reforms worked actually within the judicial system as a state apparatus to distribute power
among all state authorities. Rights, which are supposed to free individuals from state repression
and the arbitrary use of power, function in a paradoxical way which can ultimately contribute to
the carceral state. This study illustrates, through a genealogical perspective, how liberal rights by
their universal characteristics fail to emancipate individuals from state coercion and violence,
and can instead ultimately legitimate and provide a place for disciplinary power of the state. In
this thesis, I will work through this paradox through an analysis of rights discourses against the
rise of mass incarceration in the United States.
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the role of right claims in the mass
incarceration era, to explain how liberal movements and reforms in the legal system eventually
have contributed to the increase of prisoners and the development of the carceral state. I argue,
that instead of being humane- as they claim- they are going to keep more and more people in
jails and prisons or as Foucault describes they have this tendency to create a “tuned justice
towards a closer penal mapping of the social body” (Foucault, 2012, p. 78). The right as a
mechanism of the state historically has had a paradoxical nature. On the one hand, it functions as
a tool to stand against the political coercion and servitude, arbitrary use and abuse of the state,
and on the other hand, it is how the dominant social powers can apply and enforce their power
and interests.
The methodology that I am using is Foucault’s genealogy and critical theory. As I will
illustrate in the method’s section of this research, there are some common characteristics among
these methodologies which enable us to combine some elements of their approaches to explain
how structural changes in society reproduce a constant social problem like mass incarceration. I
use genealogy and critical theory because, on the one hand, critique is embedded in genealogy as
an inherent feature, and on the other hand, problematization as one of the main characteristics of
Foucault’s genealogy can be found in critical theory, especially in the work of Theodor Adorno
(Allen, 2016).
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The research question of this thesis is: ordinarily, one might assume that rights claims are
essential for positive and progressive movements against incarceration. In this project, I ask how
the right claims produce and expand incarceration? And how this paradox is evident in the
foundations of Foucauldian theories of liberal rights? And then how is this paradox bound up
with how liberal movements expand carceral states?
The plan of this chapter begins with introducing and diagnosing the issue in hand which
is mass incarceration in the US as the biggest jailer in the world (Berger, 2018) and its
importance in everyday lives of modern individuals especially the poor and minorities. “More
than two million people (out of a world total of nine million) now inhabit U.S. prisons, jails,
youth facilities, and immigrant detention centers” (Davis, 2011, p.10). Then, I will explore and
define briefly other main terms and concepts of the research question, which are rights
discourses, liberalism, liberal movements, and reforms.

Project Rationale
Rights embody a paradoxical mechanism for individuals. Many contemporary legal and
punishment scholars argue this paradox in a variety of ways and some empirical examples as it
relates to liberalism, rights, and reform. For examples, Murakawa (2014) claims that the liberal
notion of race-neutral agenda and racial violence policies of law-makers contribute to the
development of the carceral state (Murakawa, 2014). Furthermore, reform litigation -as an
outgrowth of the civil rights movement- on behalf of state prisoners aimed at reducing
incarceration ultimately led to a massive increase in prison capacity in Florida (Schoenfeld, 2018
& 2010). Also, Hinton (2016), argues that the formation of mass incarceration in the US is a
bipartisan story of Republicans and liberal welfare programs (Hinton, 2106). Miller& Stuart
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(2017) explain how mass incarceration affects political rights of individuals and is producing a
kind of second citizenship for people with criminal records (Miller& Stuart, 2017). Gilmore
(2007) explains the role of governmental- organized and funded policies such as the dispersal of
minorities and marginalized people from urban areas to rural regions had a huge impact on massincarceration in the US.
Moreover, Foucault (2012), as a foundational theorist of incarceration and social control,
introduces the irrational or inhumane history behind the formation of imprisonment, which has
been described as a humane and rational reform movement by its earliest advocates. In other
words, Foucault (2012) argues that the production of imprisonment is a mechanism for the
distribution of power within the judicial system, although it is being claimed that it is a humane
reform.
This research aims to offer a full and detailed understanding of how liberal movements
and reforms, in the long run, have contributed to the increase of prisons and the development of
the carceral state; by tracing rights discourse regarding incarceration, from the first case
involving movements toward the production of prison as a humane alternative for corporal
punishments in the eighteenth century to the more recent case such as the civil rights movements
of the 1940s and early 1960s.
My research will help to trace the process of the development of liberal rights, which I
argue are the essence of rationality which has brought by itself the complex and intense
bureaucracy. This complex system has led to irrational consequences. Mass incarceration is one
of these irrational consequences. To articulate and find the connections between rights claims,
liberalism, rationality, and imprisonment, I try to analyze genealogically the way that reforms
3

and rights claims make the prisons increase. They not only do not make any progressive step
toward emancipation, but also eventually contribute to more exclusion, marginalization, and
consequently mass incarceration.
In the debate leading up to the role of liberalism and neoliberalism to mass incarceration,
several scholars made arguments for or against the idea that right claims function in different
ways. Murakawa (2014) asserts that the liberal notion of race-neutral agenda and racial violence
policies of law-makers contributes to the development of the carceral state. Murakawa (2014)
tries to draw how the different liberal policies in the US expand the carceral state. The difference
between Murakawa’s study and this study is about the methodology he used and also the way I
theoretically address the issue of mass incarceration. He tries to analyze specifically the social,
economic, and political policies, which led to the development of prison more empirically and
show how these policies directly or indirectly affected incarceration in the US. However, my
study tries to give the readers a comprehensive foundation of the role of liberal ideologies-such
as universal liberal rights, the new notion of responsibility, and intensified individualityultimately expand the carceral state. Besides, this study aims to critique these well-established
notions and institutions in a genealogical though reconsidering whether the creation of the prison
at the first place and after that the universal and liberal rights as a progressive step in human
beings history.
Furthermore, this study has borrowed many critical ideas from the works of Brown
(1995) in respect to the understanding of how rights can be paradoxical in contrast to what they
are claimed to be an emancipatory force and the role of the liberal and neoliberal state on
marginalizing, excluding people especially racial minorities. Brown’s (1995) main
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concentrations are on how the sexual and gender role are defined by neoliberal legal and political
power. However, much less work has been done to identify how right’s paradox is bound up with
the role of liberal movements in expanding the carceral states.
My research also contributes to knowledge due to its unique methodology (genealogy and
the critical theory) by which I could analyze the dominant right discourses and found out how
these discourses affect the formation of prison and prison development over time. This study,
also, tries to develop the notion of how liberalism affects the way we think and disable
individuals to think critically and assume all well-established notions and institution something
pre-determined and inevitable. This research wants to question this idea through genealogical
and critical theory in order to show how these notions are questionable, such as rights, reforms,
and progress. There are plenty of rooms for future work in these areas, especially about their
theories in universality, rights, and state. This research tries to discover some of these theoretical
connections.

Overall, I hope that this research provides information that can be valuable in

understanding how the well- established liberal rights, rationality and prisons are being used to
protect status-quo. This study, will critique these liberal values by a genealogical perspective

Conceptual Framework
Mass incarceration
For most of the twentieth century, the mean of the prison population was about 110 per
100,000. Since 1973 this amount started to increase and has continued to increase until now.
(Garland, 2001). The mass incarceration or mass imprisonment is used to describe the institution
that has emerged in these last four decades despite the reduction of American crime rates of the
5

1990s afterward (Garland, 2001). Today, 10 million people pass through America’s jails
annually, more than 1.5 million are held in prisons and detention centers on any given day, 4.5
million are on parole or probation, and uncounted masses daily are stopped, frisked, harassed,
and surveilled (Berger, 2018) which is an unprecedented and extraordinary phenomenon in the
history of the US and in general, in the history of modern societies (Garland, 2001). Mass
incarceration has two criteria that the US meets these two. First, it is about the amount of prison
population, which is incomparable with any time in the history of the US (Garland, 2001). It is
about the “masses,” which means that specific types of groups and populations are dealing with
the criminal justice system and imprisonment, especially young black poor males in large urban
areas (Garland, 2001). Imprisonment has become a part of their everyday lives and normalized as
a predictable experience among these groups in which they are socialized. Furthermore, it is
about the “mass” because, although, it directly affects prisoners, it indirectly affects their
families, communities, and society as a whole to the extent that they have direct personal
knowledge about the imprisonment (Garland, 2001).
The prison growth happened at a time in the late twentieth century when the crime rate
came down (Gilmore, 2007; Zimring, 2006). For example, in the state of California, although,
the crime rate peaked in 1980 and declined afterward, the prison population increased about 500
percent between 1982 and 2000 comprising disproportionally of African American and Latinostwo- thirds of the state’s 160,000 prisoners (Gilmore, 2007). The disconnection between crime
and prison is nothing new; Foucault (2012) believes that this phenomenon happened at the
beginning of prison development in France. He states that “prisons do not diminish the crime
rate: they can be extended, multiplied or transformed, the quantity of crime and criminals
remains stable or, worse, increases” (p. 265).
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Why did the US experience the growth in prison population even though the crime rate
went down in the late twentieth- century until now? The first explanation is about the demand of
the public for reducing crime and concern for social order. Government officials, policy makers,
and the media repeatedly referred to society condemnation of prevalent deviant behavior to
justify prison growth. It was more moral panic instead of legal one at the time when
unemployment and inflation should be caused more worries than the crime rate. However, if the
crime rate were the concern of people and their demand, they would have what they wanted,
which is crime reduction (Gilmore, 2007).
Another explanation for mass incarceration and prison growth is about the unrestrained
drug using and trading, which are claimed to be a threat to public safety. The drug commitments
to state and federal prison system, which increased 975 percent between 1982 and 1999 can
support this argument (Gilmore, 2007). However, according to the Federal Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS), illegal drug using declined dramatically since the mid-1970s in the United States
and among all kinds of people (Tonry, 1995).
The third argument toward mass incarceration and prison growth relies on the structural
changes in employment opportunities. Based on this explanation, lack of job opportunities for
masses and a large number of people opens this room for them to find some illegal alternatives
and sources for their incomes especially for those committing property crimes and trading illegal
substances which account for a substantial amount of prison populations. Although government
officials and media reported long-term drop-in crime rates began in 1980 (Gilmore, 2007), they
argued that this growth in prison populations is about the aggressive intolerance of public toward
crimes which make lawmakers to introduce new kinds of sentences for those behaviors that used
7

to punish differently (Gilmore, 2007). The weaknesses of the mentioned explanation make us
conclude that the relationship between crime rate and prison growth cannot justify the
pathological phenomenon of mass incarceration. In the next paragraphs, I will describe other
alternatives and explanations toward mass incarceration.
The first explanation argues that the prison growth targets people of color and gets rid of
them, especially young black men, through a set of agendas such as lawmaking, prosecution, and
policing which is called racial cleansing (Miller 1996; Mauer 2006; Goldberg 2002) in order to
exploit and force them to work and make profit. The problem of this explanation, which is called
“new slavery,” is that only a few prisoners work for anybody during their sentence (Gilmore,
2007). Two other counter explanations are based on pursuing profit as a reason for prison
growth. The first one relies on the privatization and outsourcing of prisons. However, the fact
that 95 percent of prisons are publicly owned (Gilmore, 2007) makes us conclude that this
explanation is not accurate. The second one focuses more on extracting surplus cash out of
prisons. These arguments lead us to the next explanation for prison expansion, which focuses on
the role of the state to provide more jobs for white guards by keeping people of color in jails in
rural areas. The fact that prisoners, most of the time, are concentrated far from their homes,
especially in rural areas, and the difference between host communities and prisoners support this
argument (Gilmore, 2007).
The last explanation of mass incarceration and prison growth that is the main focus of
this research is what is called the reformist school. This theory analyzes the interlocking of
prison and legal reform and inquires the role of various groups of activists, such as benevolent
liberals or women fighting domestic and sexual violence in normalizing prison; it also analyzes
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the expansion use of prison as a remedy for the thwarted rights of both prisoners and injured
persons (Gottschalk, 2002 & Davis, 2011). This perspective considers how political identities are
defined by injury (Brown, 1995) and the orders which derived by punishment identify state
norms and practices (Garland, 2001).
Right discourse
In this part, I try to draw a brief history of the theories of right to make sense of the next
chapters which are based especially on a Foucauldian theory of right and his critique on modern
natural right. I review the dominant discourse of right called natural right, which has been
claimed or attributed to being a part of the United States Declaration of Independence and some
other countries’ constitutions. MacGuigan (1966) defines the following four universal
characteristics of natural law:
(a) Natural Law usually consists of one or several generalized but nevertheless
essentially concrete, moral or legal 'values' or 'value judgments'; (b) these 'value
judgments' are, in accordance with their 'absolute source' - 'Nature' Revelation (God) or
Reason - universally valid and immutable; (c) they are within the reach of human reason
properly employed and therefore, the objects of ratiocination; (d) once perceived in their
absoluteness and 'pure rationality' they overrule very form of Positive Law...It never
ceases to search for a unifying higher point of view which would endow the notion of law
with something above its naive 'givenness' (p. 239-240).
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The following paragraphs will clarify how the classic doctrine of natural law has altered
and developed by the effort of Renaissance’s legal and political philosophers, and it was given a
modern and liberal notion called “natural right”.
Classic natural law
The natural theory of law has a long history from the ancient Greek to contemporary
legal theory and political philosophy. Socrates is said to be the founder of the traditional doctrine
of natural law which has developed afterward by Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Christian
thinkers, especially Thomas Aquinas (Strauss, 1950). In the classical notion of natural law, the
individual can become complete and perfect only within the context of political order and in the
corporal world. In other words, classical political philosophy considered civil society as a
requirement for human perfectibility. The perfection of man is possible when a society kept
together by mutual trust, and without such trust, freedom would be impossible. According to
classical political philosophy and the ancient notion of natural law, man is a social being and
cannot live or live well without others. Man’s speech, which means communication distinguishes
him from other creatures. Humanity means sociality, and man is defined usually in relations to
others regardless of whether his act is “social” or “antisocial” (Strauss, 1950).
The basis of natural law in its strict sense according to traditional political philosophy is
the man’s natural sociality. Since the nature of human being is social, “the perfection of his
nature includes the social virtue par excellence, justice; justice and right are natural” (Strauss,
1950, p. 129). Based on this notion of natural law, all individuals in relation to one another are
aware of the fact that there is no freedom to act as they please or want. “Man's freedom is
accompanied by a sacred awe, by a kind of divination that not everything is permitted. We may
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call this awe-inspired fear man's natural conscience” (Strauss, 1950, p. 130). Therefore, restrain
is as natural as freedom.
Modern natural right
The modern concept of natural right is closely related to natural law and has developed
by the Renaissance thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau who radically changed some
of the presupposition of natural law theory. In other words, although, the natural right theory is a
post-Renaissance notion, the natural law is an ancient and medieval concept (Strauss, 1950). In
contrast with the ancient notion of natural law, in the Hobbesian doctrine of natural right human
beings are considered as autonomous and self-developed creatures before they enter the social
world. In other words, instead of this idea that society forms the individuals, it is individuals who
shape civil society and even further, the rights of civil society derive from individuals. The focus
of the natural right theory is on human labor and what is produced by individuals as the
foundation of property (Strauss, 1950).
Furthermore, it is the individual who defines what is right to achieve self-preservation.
This means that the individual’s consent is above rational reflection and wisdom, which are the
basis of natural law in the classic point of view. In the modern doctrine of right, authority
becomes the basis of the laws instead of truth. This notion is Hobbes’ famous theory of
sovereignty in which individuals reach a mutual contest to provide peace, which is prerequisite
of their self-preservation. Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty does not mean that the right to govern is
based on positive law or a convention. Rather, it is based on natural law, which flows from the
individual’s right and contest (Strauss, 1950).
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John Locke’s theory of state nature will be the state of peace if everyone obeys the law of
nature without civil society (Strauss, 1950). In Lock’s (1947) theory of the state of nature, all
individuals are free to do their actions, their dispositions or possession, and they do so based in
related to the law of nature. Locke states that “The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern
it” (p.102). In his view, the law of nature means “reason,” which teaches individuals that no one
ought to harm the life, liberty, property of other people. For Locke, the civil society is driven by
the perpetual existence of the state of nature (Locke, 1947).
The natural right in Locke’s doctrine is innate and universal, and a tool for pursuing
happiness (Strauss, 1950). For reaching happiness, man can do whatever he thinks is fit to it,
which can lead to continual conflict. The condition of public happiness in this view is formulated
through law. The law is not inhered in nature, but it was driven from understanding and a notion
in mind, and it is no longer a discovery of what is in the things themselves (Strauss, 1950). This
notion of right is a reflection of the development of subjectivity in modern principles, and as
Strauss (1950) states “if everyone has the natural right to preserve himself, he necessarily has the
right to everything that is necessary for his self-preservation” (p 235). Here is where the modern
theory of natural right is distinguished from traditional natural law in the sense that law is no
longer objective and independent from human understanding (Strauss, 1950). In Locke’s
doctrine of natural right, the right to self-preservation does not need any absolute power or
supreme right of sovereignty. Both Hobbes and Locke believed that individuals should resist
against the established government when their self-preservation and freedom are endangered.
The ideas of Renaissance’s political philosophers especially John Locke about natural
right, human, freedom, and the state were the foundations of liberalism in the 17th century in the
12

western societies which became a distinct characteristic of enlightenment age. In the next
section, I will briefly explore the main features of liberalism. Since the right claims and reforms
are mainly discussed and developed in the age of liberalism and through liberal movement, it
will be worthy of discussing it in the next section of this chapter.
Liberalism and liberal movements
The philosophical foundation of liberalism goes back to Kant thoughts about the
preference of right over good, justice, fairness, and individual rights, which is basically in
opposition to utilitarian conceptions. The Kantian notion of liberalism is accepted by
contemporary moral and political philosophy (Sandel, 1998).
Liberalism is mostly understood as an ideology or political doctrine which is focused on
the maximization of liberty of people and especially concerned with the minimization of the state
and defend the individual’s freedom and liberty against the state. The early liberalism sets limits
to the capacity of the state through the free market and commercial exchanges and more
importantly, through the civil society and its dynamic of self-regulation (Barry, Osborne & Rose,
2013). In fact, “in the liberal view, each person is a rights bearer whose autonomy rests
metaphorically on placing the person inside rigid walls protected from the invasions of state
power” (Garth & Sarat 1998, p. 145)
Beside its concern with the free market and the minimal state, the school of liberalism as
I discussed in the previous section, deals with human right, secularism, democracy, gender and
racial equality, and religious freedom (Hashemi, 2009, Donohue, 2003, & Wolin, 2016). Further,
as Garth and Sarat (1998) state “in the liberal legal discourse, the body gains significance as the
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“territory of the self”- abounded sphere of the human being preexisting legal authority” (p.145)
or as Nedelsky (1990) argues that liberals use the concept of property rights to create “a picture
of human beings that envisions their freedom and security in terms of a bounded sphere” (p.
163).
The liberal ideas mostly are driven by the reforms and the liberal movements in the
history of the US and other societies. They are commonly called Left, liberal, or radicals as
opposed to Right or conservatives, or reactionary who are generally skeptical of popular
government and oppose plans of reformers and men in the substantial stake in established order
(Lowi, 1969).
Liberalism, for Foucault (1989) is different from the established notion of it that I showed
earlier in this section to the extent that he focuses on problematizing rights and the critical
character of liberalism. Foucault’s approach to liberalism consists of analyzing it from the
perspective of governmental reason; the rationality of political government as an activity rather
than as an institution. In this perspective, liberalism is not an ideology, a theory, a juridical
philosophy of individual freedom, or a particular form of policies applied by the state.
Liberalism, in this view, is defined as a rationality that functions as particular methods and
principals to rationalize state practices. So, the activity of government has been made practicable
and thinkable as art through liberalism and its policies (Foucault,1989).
All the aforementioned conceptual frameworks and definitions were an effort to make
sense of and also to clarify the main concepts of the research question which I try to answer in
this thesis. Mass incarceration, rights discourse, liberalism, reforms, and liberal movements are
the central frameworks of this thesis. So, based on what I discussed in the first chapter, the next
14

chapter will discuss and introduce the main and more relevant theoretical background and
sociological theory regarding the research question and will be categorized based on the different
aspects of the research question. In the third chapter, I will discuss the methodology that I use in
the research and show how genealogy and critical theory is fitted to the purpose of the study. In
the fourth chapter, I will analyze the theories and try to answer the question based on
sociological theories which I discussed in the second chapter, and finally, in the last chapter, I
will conclude and reach a reasonable answer for the question and suggest some alternatives.
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CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Overview
The production of the prison itself is connected with the concerted efforts of reformers
seeking to construct more humane punishment for those who violate the norms of society. So, it
is not surprising that “prison reform” is common in the history of imprisonment because ‘prison’
and “reform” have been associated with each other as a reformist institution from the beginning
of prison (Davis, 2011). Or, as Foucault (2010) states, “one should recall that the movement for
reforming the prisons, for controlling their functioning is not a recent phenomenon. It does not
even seem to have originated in a recognition of failure. Prison ‘reform’ is virtually
contemporary with the prison itself: it constitutes, as it were, its program” (p. 234). The prison
system was assumed to be humane in comparison to other types of punishment, like capital and
corporal punishment (Davis, 2011). This seems ironic today among abolitionists because citizen
contact with the American criminal justice system is now incomparable with other modern
societies and also in the history of imprisonment (Garland, 2001).
So, how is it possible that movements claiming to reform the inhumane punishments,
replace them with a humane one and bring emancipatory rights for criminals they were
encountering, have helped to produce a crucial social problem called “mass incarceration”? The
answer is hidden in the nature of right as absolute power (Foucault, 1980a) of the state or as
Foucault says “sovereignty” and the paradoxical structure of it (Brown, 1995).
As it is mentioned in the first chapter of this research, the purpose of the study is to
determine how rights claims expand mass incarceration and the carceral state. The issue is not
16

only how the population of prisoners has increased in recent years but also, as Weaver & Lerman
(2010) state, “how the carceral state has become a routine site of interaction between government
and citizens” (p.1). It becomes routine through the implementation of law and criminal justice
institutions which have emerged as an important force in defining citizen participation and
understandings, with potentially harmful consequences for democratic ideals (Weaver& Lerman,
2010).
In this chapter, I will provide and elaborate a comprehensive theoretical background and
show the significant works related to the issue and the role of right and liberal movements in the
mass incarceration or as I said in the research question “carceral state”. I chose the carceral state
to show how important the state is in developing and worsening the issue of mass incarceration.
This chapter is divided into seven parts. 1. Contemporary empirical and theoretical studies; 2.
The history of imprisonment as a reform; 3. Prison as a product of enlightenment age; 4. The
paradoxical nature of the right; 5. Critique of natural right; 6. Right consciousness as a part of the
right claims; 7. Rights as a disciplinary mechanism of Sovereignty.

Right Claims and Mass Incarceration in the US
Many researchers and scholars have challenged the role of liberal movements and liberal
state policies on mass incarceration and studied how they affect the way the state treats people
who violate the law. They specifically studied the certain types of legal rules and policies such as
race-neutral agenda, racial violence policies, drug regulation, reform litigation, welfare
programs, and dispersal of minorities and marginalized people from urban areas (Murakawa,
2014, Schoenfeld, 2018 & 2010, Hinton, 2016, Gilmore, 2007).
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To illustrate how liberal civil rights notions eventually aimed and developed mass
incarceration and produced the racial disparities in prisons, it is worth to clarify the
consequences of Richard Nixon’s speech or in general the dominated ideology in Civil Rights
movements era. Nixon (1968) stated that:
The first civil right of every American is to be free from domestic violence... We shall reestablish freedom from fear in America so that America can take the lead of reestablishing freedom from fear in the world. And to those who say that law-and-order is
the code word for racism, here is a reply: Our goal is justice—justice for every
American. (Nixon, 1968)
By this statement, Nixon established a rank order that implicitly meant that White rights
to safety, freedom from fear and domestic violence were paramount and not to be threatened by
“minorities” and “criminal” rights (Murakawa, 2014). These beliefs were executed in the policies
of the fight “narcotics peddlers” and “merchants of crime” which resulted to mandatory
penalties, funding prison construction, and increasing the prison population from 1968 to 2010
(Murakawa, 2014). Two decades before anti-black law and order policies of Nixon, liberal law
and order campaigns were seeking the “right to safety” as the initial requisite for racial equality.
“The Right to Safety and Security of the Person” was a part of the report of President
Harry S. Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights in 1947 which resulted in the executive order of
9980 and 9981. These orders desegregated the federal workforce and ended segregation in the
armed services.The 1947 right to safety was “an explicit sanction against white-on-black
violence, and not as it was for Nixon two decades later, an implicit summoning of black-onwhite crime” (Murakawa, 2014, p. 3).
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Murakawa (2014) argues that lawmakers constructed the civil right carceral state in
which the race-neutral and racial violence policies developed the punitive carceral state. He
believes that the expansion of the carceral state was not a reaction to civil rights; they were
exactly the civil rights which were defined by the lawmakers. In her point of view:
Liberals “criminalized” the race problem, often toward the end of compelling reform.
Across the postwar period, liberals explained a range of disparate phenomenon—
organized civil disobedience, mass uprisings, individual acts of petty crime—as
indicators that white supremacy was unsustainable. Characterized as “volcanic threat”
or “socio-racial dynamite,” black lawlessness was, for liberals, an expression of rage,
frustration, or aggression. Not biologically preordained, black lawlessness was a product
of white social engineering (p. 9).
These liberal ideas come from the notion that racism is an individual psychological
problem which can be handled by state policies and is treatable by teaching tolerance and colorblind institutions. These liberal policies naturalized racial hierarchy and rejected the fact that
racism is rooted in social, political, cultural, and economic practices. Further, Liberal Democrats
defined “crime problem” as the “Negro Problem” (Murakawa, 2014). Considering racism as an
irrational belief and individual problem resulted in the criminalization of private act which can
be solved through modernizing carceral efficiency by decreasing discretionary decisions,
increasing procedure protection, and cleansing the criminal justice system from arbitrary bias.
All these efforts were seeking to protect society from racial violence (Murakawa, 2014).
Furthermore, Schoenfeld (2010, 2018) analyzes how prison condition litigation in the
1970s which was assumed as a progress for the civil rights movement or as successful court
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challenges with long term institutional changes and aimed to reduce incarceration, eventually
expanded incarceration and helped to the explosion of the prison population in the United States.
This paradox is the result of the different political and historical context in which the initial legal
framing of prison condition litigation, policies for racial equality, and solving the problem of
overcrowding prisons translated as a court order to build prisons and expanded the coercive
capacity of the state (Schoenfeld, 2010).
The civil rights movements made this hope and provided the recourses for black
prisoners and their lawyers to seek “rights” for inmates (Cummins 1994; Jacobs 1980; Strum
1993) and change the overcrowding litigation, and prison conditions especially reduce the
reliance of state on incarceration (Schlanger, 2006). However, the assumed “success” of prison
litigation, decarceration goals, and racial justice never happened, and the opposite happened. In
fact, since 1973, “the incarceration rate in the United States has grown by 700 percent” (Western,
2006, p. 13) and “the civil rights injunction is more alive in prison, and jail setting than the
conventional wisdom recognizes” (Schlanger 2006, p. 555).
The growth of incarceration has been disproportionately concentrated on poor black men
and attributed second-class citizenship on black American since the civil rights movement
Wacquant, 2002; Western,2006). In other words, the dominant political discourse recognizes
blacks as drains on the state and not as individuals who can have the right to equal opportunities
(MacLean, 2008). Further, it recognizes prisoner as an object of potential risk, not rehabilitation,
and that is why the court order of overcrowding was translated and interpreted to build prison by
policymakers because the problem in their perspective was not keeping masses in jails and
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prisons, instead, the problem was the risk of too many people being freed from prisons
(Schoenfeld, 2010).
Other policies which led to the expansion of prisons in the United States was the liberal
social welfare or the so-called “War on Poverty”. These policies had an indirect impact and
justified the expansion of law enforcement, surveillance, and police violence through the policies
of “War on Crime” in the US (Hinton, 2016). By declaring the “war on poverty” legislation by
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, the afterward uprising especially in Los Angeles California in black
urban areas, “exposed the existing failures of the War on Poverty and yet ironically became a
metaphor that rationalized a further retreat from the more transformative notions of liberal social
reform” (Hinton, 2016, p. 65). These uprisings all around the US which rooted in the Civil Right
grievances made these assumptions among policymakers even more insidious, pathologizing
African-Americans and criminalizing behavior which facilitated the War on Crime legislation
and dissolved the initial movement of the War on Poverty (Hinton, 2016).

The History of Imprisonment as a Reform
It was a time when, in Europe and in the United States, the entire economy of punishment
was redistributed. It was a time of great ‘scandals’ for traditional justice, a time of
innumerable projects for reform. It saw a new theory of law and crime, a new moral or
political justification of the right to punish; old laws were abolished, old customs died
out. ‘Modern’ codes were planned or drawn up. (Foucault, 2012, p. 7)
Foucault (2012) starts his study, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, with a
horrible description of the public execution of a man who was convicted of attempted regicide in
21

the mid-18th century in Paris. These types of punishments were common in Europe. For
instance, under English common law, a conviction for heretics was burned alive, a conviction for
sodomy led to the punishment of being buried alive, or the penalty for a convicted female
treacherous was burning alive. However, in 1790, burning alive was replaced by the burning of
the corpse (Davis, 2011). Other modes of punishment such as banishment -which were common
before the appearance of prison- where forced labor in galleys and transportation and facilitated
the way of colonization for England in Australia and also in the North American colony of
Georgia. These wave of convicts as free labors from England during the early 1700s predated the
rise of prison and consisted of one in eight of women mostly as prostitution (Hirst, 1995).
American and European reformers started to protest against the execution in public,
torture, and other corporal punishment such as the whipping, branding, amputation and stocks
and pillories. Such punishments had more effect on the crowd of spectators and not so much on
the person who was punished and was, in essence, public spectacle (Davis, 2011). Reformers
such as Benjamin Rush in Pennsylvania and John Howard in England believed that incarceration
can lead to reform those who had violated the law if it carried out behind the walls and in
isolation (Davis, 2011). It is worth to say that the prison reforms did not target the domestic
punishments of women and slaves because what was happening for them occurred behind the
wall of their home and the amount and types of their punishment depended on their husbands or
owners (Davis, 2011).
It was not until the eighteenth century in Europe and the nineteenth century in the United
States that the imprisonment was employed as a main form of punishment. Prison system was
established by Europeans in Asia and Africa as a part of colonial rule (Davis, 2011). The
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transformation of corporal punishment and torture to imprisonment was the result of tendencies
of philosophers and intellectuals. For example, Cesar Beccaria (1764) who was influenced by
philosophers -especially Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu and the notion of equality-,
argued that punishment should not be a private and violent matter, rather, it should be public and
non-violent (Davis, 2011). Furthermore, in the second half of the eighteenth century, protests
against public executions increased rapidly among the philosopher, theoreticians of law, lawyers
and, parlementaire, in popular petitions, and among the legislators of the assemblies. As Foucault
(2012) argues, the transformation of physical punishment, the disappearance of the display of the
tortured body, burning alive and these sorts of punishments were associated with the
disappearance of punishment as a public spectacle. Punishment altered to the less immediately
physical one, more subtle, and lenient and not a public ceremony. Foucault (2012) argues:
Another form of punishment was needed: the physical confrontation between the
sovereign and the condemned man must end; this hand-to-hand fight between the
vengeance of the prince and the contained anger of the people, through the mediation of
the victim and the executioner, must be concluded. Very soon the public execution
became intolerable (p. 73).
The creation of prison as a state mechanism and the primary mode of punishment was
very much related to the rise of capitalism as well as and the appearance of the new sets of
ideologies. These new conditions reflected the rise of the new social class called bourgeoisie,
whose aspirations and interests advanced scientific, philosophical, cultural, and legal ideas.
(Davis, 2011). With the advancement of the bourgeoisie, individuals became the bearer of rights
and liberties. The notion of natural rights as the inalienable rights and liberties was included
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eventually in the American and French revolution. Although this notion was not applied to
women, workers, indigenous, and slaves, it was considered as a new and radical idea (Davis,
2011).
The purpose of imprisonment, according to John Howard, the leading Protestant reformer
of the penal system, was religious self-reflection and self-reform (Davis, 2011). Eighteen and
nineteenth-century reformers believed in solitary confinement, which is today considered as the
most severe form of punishment after death and as a form of torture. However, the prison
reformers argued that this solitude can help criminals to help themselves to flourish their souls.
From this vantage point, it is not surprising that most of the penal reformers were religious
leaders and considered the penal system the same as monastic life (Davis, 2011).
The connection between the notion of self- reflection and self-reform, which have been
applied through the model of solitary confinement and the notion of panopticon by Jeremy
Bentham (1995), the utilitarian philosopher, is how the panopticon prison with its specific
architecture and prison, in general, is designed to make working class self-disciplined individuals
capable of performing the industrial labor of the capitalist system (Davis, 2011). In the
panopticon model of prison, the prisoners are in constant fear of being watched by the warden in
isolation and the complication play of light and darkness. They cannot talk to each other also
cannot see the warden who is in the tower right in the middle of the cells circle. According to
Benham, in this way, prisoners can internalize labor habits (Bentham, 1995).
As I mentioned, it is important to know the appearance of the prison was the result of the
new conditions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and not as a superior form of
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punishment for all time. Foucault (2010) states that the carceral system must be regarded as a
complex institution comprising four dimensions:
the additional, disciplinary element of the prison; the production of an objectivity, a
technique, a penitentiary ‘rationality’; the de facto reintroduction, if not actual increase,
of a criminality that the prison ought to destroy; lastly, the repetition of a ‘reform’ that is
isomorphic (p.271).
Therefore, the production of the prison was the result of many different historical events
and the development of a new ideology. Would be whether a punitive system which emerged in
a particular historical moment and specific circumstances during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries can be the only and absolute claim on twenty-first century? (Davis, 2011)

Prison Development as Economic Rationality
The penitentiary movements against corporal and capital punishment were associated
with the new waves of intellectual tendencies against the formidable traditional punishment like
execution in public with torture and other corporal types of punishment. These waves were the
result of the enlightenment age as well as “activist interventions by Protestant reformers, and
structural transformation associated with industrial capitalism” (Davis, 2011, p. 42).
Foucault (2012) argues that the transformation from applying “inhumane” punishment on
a criminal who is considered as “outside nature” to what is assumed to be “humane”, is not
because of some profound humanity that the criminal conceals within him, but it is because of a
“necessary regulation of the effects of power” (p.92). This “economic rationality” must
determine and calculate the proper penalty through certain techniques (Foucault, 2012). So,
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“humanity,” according to Foucault (2012) is a respectable name that justifies this particular
economy and calculation.
There is, therefore, a problem here: how was this man-measure opposed to the
traditional practice of punishment? How did he become the great moral justification of
the reform movement? Why this universal horror of torture and such lyrical insistence
that punishment be “humane”? Or, which amounts to the same thing, how are the two
elements, which are everywhere present in demands for a more lenient penal system,
“measure” and “humanity”, to be articulated upon one another, in a single strategy?
(Foucault, 2012, p. 74)
The concept of “economic rationality” by Foucault is built upon the idea of rationality
and its consequences in modern society. Weber (1993) and after that, Ritzer (1983) defines the
notion of rationality and irrationality. Weber (1978) defines formal rationality as the degree to
the action that is happening as an outcome of quantitative and proper calculations. He states that
formal rationality requires the rational calculation of means to the ends that are established on
laws, rules, and regulations (Kalberg, 1980). Moreover, formal rationality, according to Weber,
is connected to a legal and economic structure and the bureaucratic supremacy with
industrialization (Karlberg, 1980).
For Ritzer (1983), formal rationality is “the search by people for optimum means to a
given end [that] is shaped by rules, regulations, and larger social structures” (1983, p. 19).
Furthermore, Weber (2013) states that “the development of economic rationalism is partly
depended on rational technique and law; it is at the same time determined by the ability and
disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical, rational conduct” (p. xxxix).
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The formal rationality is processed through a social mechanism called bureaucracy that
Weber describes it as the “paradigm case of formal rationality” (Ritzer, 1983, p. 20). For Weber
(1993), there is nothing natural about Western rationality, which represses natural human
feelings and aspirations. So, the increased rationality results in an “Iron Cage,” which traps
individuals in rational calculation and control (Weber,1993).
According to Ritzer (1983), rationality functions through bureaucracy, which is a
dehumanizing place in which to work and by which to be serviced. He introduces one form of
rationality called McDonaldization, which has swept across the social world because it offers
increased efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control. However, these characteristics
conceal with them some serious disadvantages. As Ritzer (1983) states, “Rational systems
inevitably spawn irrationalities that limit, eventually compromise, and perhaps even undermine
their rationality”. So, McDonaldization as the manifestation of rationality can lead to
inefficiency, unpredictability, loss of control, incalculability, homogenization, and
dehumanization (Ritzer, 1983). Irrationality shows that rational systems have lost their mystery
and magic or in general are disenchanted. Furthermore, irrationality reveals that rational systems
are unreasonable system and dehumanizing (Ritzer, 1983).
Rights claims as the product of rationality and a manifestation of reason function through
bureaucratic mechanisms and can lead to irrational consequences that ultimately through its
techniques and economic rationality dehumanize individuals and trap individuals into the iron
cage. In the last chapter of this study, I will expand this argument more.
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The Paradoxical Nature of the Right
it is not through recourse to sovereignty against discipline that the effects of disciplinary
power can be limited, because sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two
absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of power in our society. If one
wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against
disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that
one should turn. but towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which must indeed
be anti-disciplinarian. but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty
(Foucault, 1980b, p 108).
Wendy Brown (1995) illustrates how rights claim can be paradoxical in contrast to what
it is historically claimed to be as an emancipatory force on behalf of politicized identities in
contemporary American political life. Brown (1995) challenges this traditional notion of right as
a force for formal emancipation for individuals who have been stigmatized, marginalized, and
traumatized by particular social identities and asks these questions:
What does it mean to deploy rights on behalf of identities that aim to confound the
humanist conceit? What are the consequences of installing politicized identity in the
universal discourse of liberal jurisprudence? And what does it mean to use a discourse of
generic personhood-the discourse of rights-against the privileges that such discourse has
traditionally secured? (p. 96).
According to Brown (1995), rights are irresolute signifiers in the sense that they have
diverse, inconstant, and even a contradictory nature, varied based on time, culture, race, gender,
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class, ethnicity, age, wealth, and education. To illustrate these contradictions, Brown (1995)
asserts, rights can be manifested as markers of power, masking lack, as boundary and as access,
as claims, as protection, as disciplinary and anti-disciplinary, as an indication of one’s humanity
and also as a reduction of one’s humanity.
For example, although rights can have an emancipatory force in a specific time and
location like Civil Rights movement in America, they can be in another time and place a
regulatory discourse and as a means of obstructing more radical political demands or without any
valuable promises. Another example is the prison itself, although putting people in jail may
provide some rights to individuals against those who violate these rights, like civil rights which
are violated by sexual assault and harassment, or property rights which can be violated by theft
or robbery, it can also limit or destroy the right of freedom of many other people.
In fact, as Derrick Bell (2018) argues, although the historical and political event of Civil
Rights is undisputable, the emancipatory forces of these movements are not durable over time or
as Nietzsche states “liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on,
there are no worse and no more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions” (p. 213).
The libaratory and egalitarian force of rights have always been limited historically and
culturally and have no “innate capacity either to advance or impede radical democratic ideals”
(Brown, 1995, p. 97). Therefore, the ahistorical, acultural, acontectual characteristic of rights
distances them from specific political and historical contexts and that is why they operate as a
universal and generic political discourse rather than provisional or partial (Brown, 1995).
Accordingly, as Brown (1995) illustrates rights function within "dissimulating ideology of
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modernism," and consequently, a deep gap between the discourses of rights and their operation
would consistently exist (p. 97).
Furthermore, another paradoxical characteristic of rights can be found in occasions that
right can offer some privileges to one group and at the same time can disempower someone else
in other places or the same people in the other time (Brown,1995). In fact, “at the moment a
particular "we" succeeds in obtaining rights, it loses its "we-ness" and dissolves into individuals”
(Brown, 1995, p. 98). The good example of this paradox can be found in the writings of Karl
Marx (1842) on wood theft. He argues how right of landowners monopolized the common
properties as a part of the private property and disadvantaged the poor from their customary
rights on fallen wood they collected in the forest. Landowners have this right in two ways. They
earn not only compensation (fine) from this so-called crime, but also, they stand in the position
of the state by punishing these “criminals”.
The other paradox of right is in the universal-local paradox of right itself. According to
Brown (1995), the contradiction occurs when in the late modernity, we historicized rights even
though we discredit history at the same time. In other words, we link rights to history in the sense
that the value of rights for us is based on which political power has situated them and which
social groups have them historically, and simultaneously we question the structures and stability
of the existing identities and try to measure the political effectiveness of the right with respect to
the analysis of social stratifications and classifications (Brown,1995). This paradox leads to
another paradox of rights in the sense that the late modernity effort to modify the individualist
and universalist notion of rights in order to provide a more productive form of political
recognition such as “group rights”, “right of differences” or right of “cultural minorities” is
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limited by “the contemporary historical, geopolitical, and analytical destabilization of identity
upon which such formulations depend” (p. 99). In other words, might the relationship of
contemporary rights claims- that intend to protect historically and contextually contingent
identities- with the universal idiom of rights results to resubordinate by renaturalizing of what it
was supposed to emancipate? (Brown, 1995). As Meister (1991) states “for itself, representation
is a means for the people to transform the state [while] in itself, it is a means for the state to
control the people” (p.172). That said, rights which were sought by identities by “itself” become
a means of administration and regulation for “themselves” or identities who expressed through
rights become production and regulation of identities by bureaucracy and law.
On a different note, the rights that emerged in modernity function in two paradoxical
ways; as a means for emancipation from political coercion and institutionalized servitude, and as
a vehicle for privileging the emerging bourgeois class within a “discourse of formal
egalitarianism and universal citizenship” (Brown, 1995, p 99). Rights, on the one hand, is a
means of protection against the arbitrary use of power by the state, and on the other hand, is a
means for naturalizing and securing dominant social powers. Accordingly, the bourgeois
discourse not only depoliticizes the social power of institutions such as private property and
family but also provides a place for exploitation and regulation for the mass (Brown, 1995). So,
the effort of rights to recognize identities as the political identities like “group rights” or rights of
“differences” or the rights of minorities is evidence of regulation and bureaucratization of
rights(Brown, 1995) or what Foucault (1990) called it “bio-power”.
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Critique of Natural Right Theory
Foucault and Ewald (2003) address the question of right through a certain political
philosophy which he terms “theory of sovereignty”. In order to do so, he is not trying to develop
the actual function of law as the presupposition of thinkers such as Hobbes and Rousseau and the
idea that law reasonably established by people or by particular wills based both on a unity of
power and a set of limits to apply it (Golder, 2013). These notions of law became a sufficient
qualification of power and also unshakable confidence for law in seventeenth and eighteen
centuries in France and Britain. Foucault tries to criticize the traditional notion of law by
showing the “transition of power” in modern societies with the formation of “bio” and
“disciplinary” powers (Golder, 2013).
Sovereignty, according to Foucault and Ewald (2003) are not referring to the exercise of
repressive and massive power, but it is about the right of public power which is embedded in the
sacred and natural rights of subjects. Individuals in this sense are the original and only bearers of
rights whose rights are above every juridical system, and they decide to delegate them to the
sovereignty to apply the public power which will rule over them (Golder, 2013). Foucault and
Ewald (2003) argue that this cycle is the basis of sovereignty, which tries to subjectify the
subjects -from natural subjects to political subject. In his words:
An individual who is naturally endowed (or endowed by nature) with rights, capabilities,
and so on—can and must become a subject, this time in the sense of an element that is
subjectified in a power relationship. Sovereignty is the theory that goes from subject to
subject, that establishes the political relationship between subject and subject (p. 43).
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Although Foucault (1997) argues that the appeals of natural law have an important role
for limiting the right to govern, his practice of critique is about the particular event- like structure
and configuration of power and knowledge and not the universal structure of them. This
argument applies to the system of punishment that emerged at a particular time, place, and social
context. Foucault (1997) insists on the “pure singularity” of the modern system of punishment
and believes that “there is no foundational recourse, no escape within a pure form” (p.56).
Foucault’s preference of the particular or event-like over the universal character of both
the system of power and knowledge means to rule out any appeal to right or rights (Patton, 2005)
His reluctance to accept any universalist characteristics of human nature is because, in
contemporary moral and political philosophy approaches, rights are usually perceived as relying
on universal characteristics of human nature or the human condition suppose that “right bearing”
inheres in human nature (Patton, 2005).
The natural theory of rights, especially Locke’s ideas that introduce the central tenets of
modern liberalism, has been continued by contemporary political philosophies. These liberal
notions of rights have been attacked by sociologists. For example, Morris (2006) criticized three
fundamental aspects of the liberal view of rights.
First, Morris (2006) questions the liberal view of the right’s perception of personal
identity as a given or as a property of individuals before social participation. This perception of
personal identity became common in the Rawlsian notion of an “original position” behind an
imagined “veil of ignorance” (Rawls, 2009). By contrast, the sociological notion of personal
identity perceived it not as a “given”, but as an achievement. In fact, according to this
perspective, right as a part of the personal identity is an achievement won in the life course of
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participation in social practice (Morris, 2006). So, personal autonomy can be achieved when
individuals have interpersonal, cultural-linguistic, social and structural, emotional condition of
life (Morris, 2006).
Second, the liberal notion of rights assumes that individuals can devise and progress a
life-plan as long as they not interfered with by others (Morris, 2006). This liberal view of right
presupposes that everyone has an equal chance to achieve a self-identity that requires a social,
cultural, and structural condition in an individual’s life. So, any failure to have these conditions
can result in the failure to progress a life-plan. (Use it in Chapter 4 as discussion)
The third critique is expressed in Durkheim’s work (2005), indicating that human life is
not possible without some connection with the life of society. Even the most isolated people have
some cultural and social attachment to society, such as the hermit or religious recluse. So, the
life- plan of an individual includes a certain version of his relationship with others and his lifeplans (Morris, 2006).

Right Consciousness as a Part of Right Claims
As Nielsen (2000) argues the study of legal consciousness of ordinary people requires
“exploring how they think about the law and how their understanding of legal institutions and
legal rules affect their day-to-day lives” (p.5). She believes that the study of the legal
consciousness illustrates both how people think and perceive law and how their unconscious
ideas about the law affect their lives. Furthermore, legal consciousness studies determine the role
of law and legal norms in constructing understanding, affecting actions, and also shaping some
aspects of life (Nielsen, 2000). Using law is not the same for all individuals in society and every
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social group and class use it differently. Merry (1990), also, defines legal consciousness as “the
way people conceive of the natural and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of
talk and action, and their commonsense understanding of the world” (p.5). Thus, the way a white
male in a privileged social class use law is completely different from the Black prisoners from a
lower class. In fact, prisoners in the United States using their rights in a way conducted and
guided by activist courts and guided by thick volumes of regulations which are hard to
understand and unreachable.
The different legal consciousness based on the different social and structural background
of people and consequently, and different right- assertion is illustrated in the work of Williams
(1987). Williams (1987) believes that Blacks and whites experience different levels of rightassertion as they are empowering and disempowering. The difference in their experience results
in a discourse boundary, complex and contradictory social understanding of rights. Therefore,
for Williams, rights are essential: “for the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is
symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply respect that places one in the
referential range of self and others that elevates one's status from human body to social being”
(p. 416)
Williams (1987) insists on the importance of rights for blacks, poor, and other minorities,
and believes that rights can be the only tools for emancipation for blacks and civil rights
movements can prove this. When African- American achieved their purposes partially for civil
rights through the established political, economic, and legal system, however, I argue that these
temporal achievements that as I said can be assumed “reforms” are inherently not humane or
some radical steps toward emancipation and freedom, but they are the part of an institutional
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transformation which has its own goals. That is true that it sounded to us now that the only way
to limit the repressive power of the state is through the right mechanism, but we cannot ignore
the paradoxical nature of right which is always at work. That is why the prisons in the U.S now
are full disproportionately by African- Americans because rights always function through
disciplinary mechanisms of the state.

Rights as a Disciplinary Mechanism of Sovereignty
The political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate
the individual from the state ... but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of
individualization which is linked to the state (Foucault, 1982, p. 785).
If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce” (Arendt & Kohn,
2006, p. 163).
The early reform movements against traditional punishments began by the reformers
wanted to limit state power to punish both in the means they used and the extent of their use by
creating fixed and defined rules and subjecting the authorities to rigid control (Rusche &
Kirchheimer, 2003). The attempts of Beccaria, Bentham, and Montesquieu targeted to organize
regulation and to calculate the way punishment is applied by recognizing the correlation of crime
and punishment. The reforms for changing law in terms of the public trial, free choice of lawyer,
trial by jury, suppression of torture, a clearly defined law of evidence, protection against illegal
imprisonment were the examples of how these reforms limited and defined the role of state in
criminal procedure in the name of humanity and human progress which supposed to make some
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progress for all classes. But the experience has shown that the effects of new procedures differed
widely among the different social classes, races, and genders (Rusche & Kirchheimer, 2003).
Foucault (2012) believes that the true goal of reform movements was not actually to
reform the traditional punishments in a more equitable form but to establish a new “economy” of
the state to punish and to “distribute” power in a more organized form. By this way, power
cannot be concentrated at the certain privileged points or give a room for the discretion of judges
and prosecutions to apply law and justice, and it can be divided between opposing authorities
(Foucault, 2012). Therefore, the actual goal of penal reforms tried to distribute power in a more
homogeneous, effective, continuous, regular, constant, and more detailed way which enabled it
to operate everywhere and effectively while decreasing the economic and political costs of
punishment. In summary, the new judicial theory of punishment was consistent with a new
“political economy” of power to punish (Foucault, 2012).
The modern punitive system is based on a certain “economic rationality” that functions
through some techniques and mechanisms. Punishment in the disciplinary power regime is not
trying to take vengeance, expiate, or repress, but it is trying to differentiate individuals through a
value-giving measure in a quantitative term based on the value of abilities, the level, and the
nature of individuals (Foucault, 2012). Further, it provides “a space of comparison,
differentiation, and the principle of a rule to be followed” (p. 182). These rules function as a
minimum, average, and optimum to follow and respect. Accordingly, through the system of
value-giving and differentiation, the boundaries of conformity is clarified and is limited to
facilitate the recognition of abnormal. Therefore “The perpetual penality that traverses all points
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and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes,
homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes” (p. 183).
Normalization, according to Foucault (2012) is one of the most important instruments of
power at the modern age. The degree of normality determines “membership of a homogeneous
social body” (p. 184). It also functions as a tool for classifying, hierarchizing, and distribution of
ranks. Foucault (2012) argues the power of norms is compatible with the system of “formal
equality” because of the homogeneity that normalization imposes.
Normalization, according to Foucault (2007), constructs individuals within a network of
techniques of power and tools. Normalization functions through introducing a model. All the
disciplinary mechanisms try to get individuals, movements, and any actions to conform to this
model (Foucault, 2007). That said, in normalization, individuals are distinguished between
normal and abnormal based on the degree they follow the norms that disciplinary techniques
offer.
The reform movement of punishment, according to Foucault (2012), has not only one
origin. Many different interests such as enlightened members of the public, philosophes who
supposed themselves as the enemies of despotism and friends of mankind, social groups who
criticized parliaments, instigated the reform movements. The reforms were not completely
outside the “legal machinery and against all its representatives” (p. 81), but they were organized
within the legal machinery and by a large number of administrators seeking common objectives
and the power conflicts that divided them (Foucault, 2012).
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For Foucault (1980a), the dominant ideology of the bourgeois class in judicial system
affected both proletarianized and non- proletarianized classes that created and maintained a
division between these two. The bourgeois ideology affected especially on proletarian in terms
of defining what is just and what is unjust. For instance, about theft, property, crime, and
criminals. This ideology affected, also, non- proletarianized class in many ways, for example, it
offered them some choices; being in prison or joining the army, being in prison or going to
colonies, going to prison or joining the police. Thus, they became racialist when they were in
colonies; became nationalist when they armed, and became fascist when they were police force
(Foucault, 1980a). These influences were very profound in both proletariat and non- proletariat
people in a completely subtle way to the extent that bourgeoisie is unconscious about how it
works and progress.
Therefore, punishment in disciplinary mechanism is opposed to a judicial penality which
functions through referring to the text of laws, specifying acts based on certain general
cetegories, and making binary opposition of what is permited or forbidden. On contrary,
Diciplinary mechanisms operate by differentiating, hierchizing, and homogenizing idividuals
(Foucault, 2012, p 183).
Finally, the general goal of punishment is not to eliminate crimes, but it is trying to
distribute, distinguish, and use them (Foucault, 2010). Therefore, punishment is not seeking to
deter those who are supposed to obey the law, but it tends to assimilate the disobedience in a
“general tactics of subjection” (p. 272). The main purpose of penalty, thus, is not checking
illegalities, but it differentiates them and provide a general economy for them (Foucault, 2010).
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If now we can talk about justice, it is not only because the law benefits a class, it is also
because “differential administration of illegalities through the mediation of penality forms part of
those mechanisms of domination. Legal punishments are to be resituated in an overall strategy of
illegalities. The failure of the prison may be understood on this basis” (p.272).
Therefore, as I illustrated in this chapter, the expansion of prison, especially in the US
can be understood not because of the failure of prison reforms, or failure of its functioning, but
failure is a part of the prison agenda. It is functioning through this apparent “failure”. Thus, if
we are witnessing the mass- incarceration in the US, it is not because there is something wrong
in a specific part of the prison system; instead, the prison functions through this way. It
differentiates individuals, It excludes racial minorities, especially blacks from other people, It
makes minorities “others, It subjectifies individuals, and these purposes can be fulfilled by rights
discourse. The way state uses and applies the rights- as its absolute power- contributes to the
realization of these porpuses. Understanding the actual functions of the prison requires a
genealogical perspective which questions not only the internal defects of the established
institution of the prison but also, it questions the external situations and conditions which as
Weber (2013) states have “elective affinities” to create a phenomenon (imprisonment).
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CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY
I use genealogy and the critical theory as my methodology to analyze how the dominant
right discourses affected the formation of prison and all its institutions. Relying on archival
documents, I studied the role of right claims and liberal reforms on the formation of the carceral
state and also traced how those reforms paved the way for mass incarceration. In this chapter, I
will define genealogy and describe how it connects to the critical theory as a methodology. I will
illustrate how critique is inherent as a component in genealogy and how it is associated with
critical theory, especially in the works of Theodor Adorno. The purpose of this chapter is to
justify why I used genealogy and critical theory as my methodology.

Genealogy’s Definition
According to Foucault (1980b) genealogy is “the union of erudite knowledge and local
memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of
this knowledge tactically today” (p. 83). Foucault (1978) defines genealogy as a “gray,
meticulous, and patiently documentary” (p. 139). Genealogy needs detailed knowledge, and vast
accumulation of materials and recourses about events not only in a gradual process of their
evolution but also it should be enabled to understand them in isolation when they tend to be
engaged with other roles (Foucault, 1978). Further, genealogy must define those instances and
moments where and when they are absent or remained unrealized (Foucault, 1978). Moreover,
the Foucauldian notion of genealogy of the subject accounts for the “constitution of knowledges,
discourses, domains of objects, and so on, without having to make reference to a subject which is
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either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout
the course of history” (Foucault, 2003, p. 306).

Genealogy and History
Foucault (1978) argues that genealogy does not reject history; rather, it rejects “the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleology and opposes itself to the
search for origins” (Foucault, 1978, p. 140). As Delacroix (2006) points out, “A genealogy
without history would be like a diving board without spring” (p. 100). However, genealogy
differs from and is not reducible to mere history (Delacroix, 2006). Genealogy’s commitment to
history mainly concerns the critical reevaluation of the given phenomenon. In other words,
genealogy does not apply history as a prerequisite of deconstructing or critiquing the events;
rather, history is a tool for doing so among other tools to reveal the impact of the historical
process that brought the institutions about (Delacroix, 2006). Genealogy uses history to interpret
the human institution by the formulation of hypothesis and “undermining ahistorical and
inflationary interpretation of human institutions” (Delacroix, 2006, p. 98).
According to Foucault (1978), genealogy opposes the search for history. That said, in a
genealogical study, a researcher knows the fact that finding the origin or ‘degree zero’ of the
objects he or she studies is impossible. The purpose of genealogy is to find the social and cultural
factors that have contributed to the emergence of the phenomenon under study (Delacroix,
2006). Genealogy’s concern is not to discover some ‘founding principle’ which would show
some definite grounding of the event, but it is seeking to illuminate and challenge the aspects of
a phenomenon which have not been shown or have been hidden (Delacroix, 2006). Genealogy
functions as a tool for revealing the artificial character of certain institutions (Delacroix, 2006).
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The genealogy of values, knowledge, and morality does not question their origins and
beginnings, but it focuses on the details and accidents which are necessarily accompanied by
their beginnings (Foucault, 1978). Genealogy rejects the argument that past actively exists in the
present and imposes a predetermined form to all aspect of the present. Therefore, genealogy
rejects the notion of the uniformity and regularity of history and insists on irregularity and
inconstancy of truth and refuses that history has a linear path (Foucault, 1978).
I used genealogy as the method for this study because it is inprobable to isolate and
imagine a situation which is not preceded by right claims. In other words, the origins of right
claims will always vanish to some further, inaccessible points. Consequently, genealogy would
contribute to avoiding the ambiguities inherent in an inquiry through making the sources of
rights claims explicit or clarify the hidden aspects of right discourse. Another reason why I used
genealogy is its purpose as revealing the artificial characters of certain phenomenon and
institutions. Accordingly, the question of this study is to reveal the hidden parts of liberal
reforms and rights claims and to question the established understanding of their artificial
characters which is claimed historically to be humane and emancipatory.

The Descriptive Nature of Genealogy
A genealogist is more interested in description rather than an explanation of historical
events and is trying to describe how the historical paths (the established traditional punishments)
are disrupted by discursive (rights claims) and non-discursive shifts and clashes. He/she also is
trying to answer “how” we are in this situation now rather than “why” (Isenberg,1991). So, the
selection of “how” in “how right claims expand the carceral states” is based on this feature of the
genealogy.
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Genealogy as Critique
As I clarified before, the ultimate goal of genealogy is to reveal and question the artificial
characters of institutions by illuminating the hidden parts of the established understanding of
events. There are some elements of critical thinking in genealogy that can be appropriately
associated with the objectives of this study. I am going to criticize the dominant right discourses
in the formation of the carceral state which despite the claimed function of rights, as
emancipation or being humane, contribute to incarceration and keeping people in prisons. That
said, the critical feature of genealogy is important for this study. For this purpose, my main
question addressed the role of critique in the Foucauldian notion of genealogy which I used as
my method. Some “critical theorists” (Habermas, 2018, Baudrillard,1978) criticized genealogy
and describe it as a methodology, which leads to a counter-discourse, irrational or conservative
in its nature (Habermas, 2018). Habermas (1989) also argues that “genealogy is overtaken by a
fate similar to that which Foucault had seen in the human sciences: to the extent that it retreats
into the reflection-less objectivity of a non-participatory, ascetic description of kaleidoscopically
changing practices of power, genealogical historiography emerges from its cocoon as precisely
the presentistic, relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science that it does not want to be”.
However, the genealogy of knowledge converges with the Frankfurt school’s critique of
instrumental rationalization, the point that Foucault acknowledged at the end of his career
(Morrow & Brown, 1994).
Foucault (1984), however, proposes a notion of enlightenment as a critical ethos or as an
art of critiquing the authority and power that manifests itself in opposing, analyzing, and
reflecting limits which are imposed to us. According to Foucault, the critical question, today,
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should be a positive one. The question must ask, “in what is given to us as universal, necessary,
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of
arbitrary constraints?” (Foucault, 1984, p.45). So, by this question, Foucault tries to transform
the critiques conducted in the form of necessary limitation into the practical critiques that take
the form of possible transgression (Foucault, 1984). This critique is genealogical in the sense that
it is not trying to conclude from the form that we are, what is impossible for us to know or do,
but it separates the form that we are from the possibility of no longer being, doing, and thinking
what we are, do, and think (Foucault, 1984). In other words, he describes critique “as the
problematization of the present”. He, also, defines critique as not being governed or at least not
being governed in a particular way or so much (Foucault, 1997).
Furthermore, Delacroix’s (2006) argument about the critical feature of genealogy is
compatible with what Foucault believed about the critique in genealogy. Critique in its everyday
sense has a negative approach toward a given phenomenon (Geuss, 2002) which is trying to
falsify, prove invalidity, or inappropriateness of the event in question (Delacroix, 2006).
However, genealogy’s concern is not to test the falsification or the validity of the objects, but to
unveil the factors, circumstances, and contexts which have led to the emergence of a certain
institution and given phenomenon (Delacroix, 2006). The ‘true’ critical ambition of genealogy
may threaten or makeover the established legitimacy of the human institutions and their
traditional resistance to revealing the historical process, which led to their emergence. As
Williams (2000) points out some ideas, values, and concept are resistant to becoming clear and
subject to explanation as they claim authority. However, this will be true and more common in
some institutions and values.
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The excellent example could be the legitimacy of rights. Right historically resist
questioning the hidden aspects of its functioning, which makes it sacred and as the only tool
toward emancipation. However, a genealogical study about rights can reveal how rights
historically have served not always the interests of the marginalized and excluded individuals,
but they have served an economy that tries to empower and maintain the interests of the
bourgeois class. Property rights, rights of security, even the rights to freedom and equality, in
their liberal notions, serve the dominant discourse of power and the moments that we think rights
are bringing justice for human beings, are the moment that the rational economy of rights
requires such a change like what we had in the rights of blacks, women, and LGBTQ
communities. Rights at these moments try to assimilate, normalize, and make the abstract
citizens by its universal and harmonized rules and principle.
In addition, In respect to rights claims and their role in the development of incarceration,
the critique component of genealogy is not trying to falsify or reject the criminal justice system
or its institution, but it is trying to challenge their established legitimacy or unveil the hidden
historical process in which they emerged. Although ordinarily, we assume that rights are the only
and the best ways to fulfill individual needs which necessarily have an emancipatory nature,
genealogy wants to shake these foundations and reveal the dark side of the legitimated
institutions. So, genealogy is not a neutral methodology; rather, it has its own interventionist
program operated by an agenda. In this methodology usually, a specific concept, value, or
institution is condemned at its very beginning (Delacroix 2006). “Whether it be applied to the
concept of justice, morality, the prison system or legal normativity, a genealogical endeavor
seeks to trigger or renew reflections on the phenomenon to be explained” (p.103).
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Therefore, using genealogy in this study means questioning, critiquing- not necessarily in
its negative notion- the situations the conditions in which the prison had room to emerge. That is
why it is necessary to explain the role of critique in genealogy, the way that it can be used in this
study. In the following part, I will argue how critique can be an inherent feature of genealogy
and what is its common characteristics with the critical theory.

Genealogy and Critical Theory
Progress occurs where it ends (Adorno, 2005, p. 150).
I would like to say something about the function of any diagnosis concerning the nature
of the present. It does not consist in a simple characterization of what we are but,
instead—by following lines of fragility in the present—in managing to grasp why and
how that-which-is might no longer be that-which-is. In this sense, any description must
always be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the
space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, that is of possible
transformation (Foucault, 2013, p. 36).
For doing this research, I used genealogy and critical theory. Critique is the inherent
component of genealogy but not in the everyday sense of critique, which is a negative approach.
I found many commonalities and rich harmonies between critical theory, especially in the works
of Theodor Adorno and the genealogy of Foucault.
Although Adorno, does not use the term of genealogy, the method which can be used for
understanding this recognition of history can be understood as a kind of problematizing
genealogy. For instance, Adorno (2003) in Negative Dialectics like Foucault, draws the
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simultaneous historical emergence of both the promise and the ideals of the enlightenment as the
unity of discontinuity and continuity. He also, like Foucault, does not reject all the norms and
values of enlightenment modernity (Allen, 2016).
Both thinkers are famous for their skepticism of progress and offering a negative
philosophy of history (Allen, 2016). For instance, Adorno (2006) states that the emergence of the
catastrophe of Auschwitz makes “all talk of progress towards freedom seem ludicrous” (p.7) and
even makes the “affirmative mentality” that engages in such talk look like “the mere assertion of
a mind that is incapable of looking horror in the face and thereby perpetuates it” (p.7).
Allen (2016) believes that an alternative methodology of thinking about history can be
found in the works of Foucault and Adorno. This methodology is neither progressive nor
repressive, but it reconstructs history as a story of both progress and repression. For Foucault and
Adorno, critique is a historical problematization. Adorno doubted the backward-looking claims,
which show that “progress” as a historical “fact” is actual. This skepticism about the historical
progress is shared by Foucault (Allen, 2016). Foucault (2013a) wants to “remove all chronology
and historical succession from the perspective of a ‘progress,’ to reveal in the history of an
experience, a movement in its own right, uncluttered by a teleology of knowledge or the
orthogenesis of learning” (p.122).
Foucault’s perspective toward progress is more philosophical than moral. However, the
way Foucault analyzes how progress in human sciences is built on the exclusion of madman,
homosexuals, social deviants and prisoners, and other “abnormals” shows that moral sensibility
is at work (Allen, 2016). Also, in a philosophical point of view, Foucault (1978) like Adorno
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(2005), believes that the traditional conception of progress, which is assumed to be atemporal
and supra-historical, is a metaphysical illusion.
Foucault and Adorno perspectives toward social transformation were not just about the
better and fuller realization of our normative ideals for a more transparent and less distorted
liberal democracy, or a more inclusive and egalitarian recognition, but also, the possibility of the
radical transformation of those ideas themselves (Allen, 2016). The radical transformative ideas
can be found in the work of Foucault, which is called the problematization. According to
Foucault (2013a), “problematization doesn't mean representation of a pre existing object, nor the
creation by discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It is the totality of discursive or nondiscursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as
an object for thought”(p.257).
By problematization, Foucault tries to know how certain behavior, phenomenon, or
processes became a problem. Foucault (2013b) applied this approach in his early work, History
of Madness. In this book, the question was how and why, at a particular moment, madness was
problematized through a certain institutional practice. Also, in his other work, Discipline, and
Punish (2012), Foucault problematized the relation between crime and punishment through penal
practices and penitentiary institutions. Foucault, in one of his late interviews, states that “I would
like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad,
but that everything is dangerous, which is not the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then
we always have something to do” (Foucault, 1997, p. 256).
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These works are posing the possibilities as Allen (2016) states: “someday we might look
back on our present preoccupation with mental illness and wonder what all the fuss was about,
and from that point of view our current historical a priori may well seem benighted” (p. 338).
Although it is hard to imagine living with that point of view, there is a critical value of
being open to this possibility that we might live in the future in a different point of view. So, for
being truly critical, critical theory has to be open to both reformism and radical transformative
changes (Allen, 2016).
Applying these approaches toward the history, progress, repression, and social
transformation, I developed a genealogical study of the role of rights claims, liberal movements,
and reforms on the expansion of the carceral state. I used the concept of problematization and
posed the questions of how and why rights claims contributed to carceral state and when they
became problematized through a certain institutional practice and apparatus of knowledge.
Using both critical theory and genealogy, I tried to question the legitimacy of wellestablished institutions which are assumed to be a “progress”. Right claims, liberal reforms, all
assumed to be “humane” and progressive steps toward emancipation. But I argue that mass
incarceration and the expansion of prisons like what Adorno (2006) thinks about Auschwitz is a
catastrophe. This is because as Adorno (2006) states “in the society in which we live, every
single progressive act is always brought about at the expense of individuals or groups who are
thereby condemned to fall under the wheels” (p.12).
In fact, the approach -which I have applied in the study of the history of rights claims and
their connection to the carceral state is trying- as Foucault (1978) states- to challenge the
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traditional conception of historical progress (i.e., rights claims) that we know now to be a
metaphysical illusion in order to pave the way for the idea of radical transformation or to suggest
something different rather than rights claims (use it in chapter 4 discussion)
As I argued, genealogy is trying to question the established concepts and institutions. I
used this methodology to question the value of right by going back to the origins of rights,
especially liberal rights- property right, liberal equality, freedom, security. To devalue these
notions, I analyze why liberal rights emerged at particular moments and how they became the
inseparable parts of the liberalism and the disciplinary power. To do a genealogical study for
revealing the hidden aspects of right claims, reforms, and social movements which contributed to
the carceral state, it is not enough to study only the one important historical events; it requires to
understand many historical events, situations, social force, and different discourses affected the
emergence of reforms toward mass-incarceration. Also, genealogy does not mean merely the
study of historical moments, but it is the “history of the current”. I use genealogy to understand
the contemporary phenomenon of mass incarceration in the US with a neo-liberal economic and
social structure.
For instance, civil rights movements or the reforms toward rooting out the corporal
punishment may be evident to the extent that they are understood as the only way for freedom
and emancipation, but genealogy’s role is to clarify the inhumane aspects of them by looking for
the origins of prison and rights. For example, as we learned in the second chapter, rightassertion for Williams (1987) is considered as an essential way toward black’s freedom.
However, a geological study about rights- as I discussed- can reveal how these rights function
within the economic rationality of punishment and in general, serve the disciplinary power of the
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state to exclude. In sum, the valuable events such as civil rights movements operate in a complex
apparatus of the liberal state to marginalize, exclude, normalize, homogenize all subjects and it
seems to us that we had partially “justice” because the rights of sovereignty and disciplinary
power are entirely compatible with the liberal and neo-liberal goals for making individuals
responsible for their self-realization. That is why after more than five decades of civil rights
movements the US is dealing with the racial discrimination not only in the criminal justice
system, but also in the whole social, cultural, and economic systems.
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CHAPTER FOUR THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I am trying to develop a theoretical discussion, find the connections
between the sociological theories that I have developed previously to answer the research
question. To do so, I will divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I will discuss how
the liberal notion of rights and freedom is against the actual freedom and how this established
notion eventually contributes to the expansion of the carceral state. In the second part, I will
develop the idea of how formal rationality, bureaucracy- as an expression or application of
formal rationality- ultimately expands prisons.

Liberal Rights and Carceral State
To the isolated, isolation seems an indubitable certainty; they are bewitched on pain of
losing their existence, not to perceive how mediated their isolation is (Adorno, 2003 p.
312).
As I illustrated in the second chapter, the new type of power was established based on the
bourgeois ideology and under the “disciplinary power”. In fact, in modern society, power is no
longer be transcribed to sovereignty. This new type of power is the foundation of industrial
capitalist society (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). Theory of sovereignty tries establishing the
subject to subject cycle. Individuals who are the only bearer of natural rights delegate these
rights to sovereignty to rule them. Individuals who were the subjects of rights that they have by
their nature now delegate this power to the state to govern them. In other words, sovereignty
requires individuals to be governed and regulated by the rights that they gave them at a particular
moment. (Foucault and Ewald, 2003).
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By rights, Foucault (Foucault and Ewald, 2003) means all apparatuses of it, from law and
rules to all institutions related to it. Right in this point of view function as a means for
domination, not only sovereignty relations but the whole of all domination relations (Foucault
and Ewald, 2003).
But the theory of sovereignty no longer lives as a theory of right. In fact, it is continued
as an ideology and as the organized principles of juridical codes which superimpose on the
mechanisms of discipline a system of rights that conceal the actual disciplinary power of the
state and its domination (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). This new system of power guarantees
everyone’s practicing of the sovereign right, which can be exercised by them. So, the right of
sovereignty and the mechanisms of disciplinary power are inseparable in modern society. But
this confrontation has its own discourses; under sovereignty, we have rights discourse, but the
scientific or clinical knowledge is the disciplinary power’s discourse which operates through
normalization and not a code of law. So, in our day, power is exercised through both right and
discipline in a way that discipline and its techniques are invading rights (Foucault and Ewald,
2003). However, the only way to limit the exercise of disciplinary power is by invoking the old
formal bourgeois right, which is, in reality, the right of sovereignty (Foucault and Ewald, 2003).
But, using sovereignty against discipline does not enable us to limit disciplinary power. These
two, sovereign and discipline- are the “two things that constitute the general mechanism of
power in our society” (p. 39).
Sovereign rights of individuals (juridical power) and disciplinary normalization bringing
play together is “repression”. Repression today is used as a tool for coercive social control.
Imprisonment is one these social control policies, especially in places that African-American,
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poor, and other minorities are deprived of their political and economic participation. Repression
is used by the state both through the juridical system (right of sovereignty) and the disciplinary
mechanisms. First, repression is applied through the prison mechanism, with all its institutions. It
is justified by crime control and the right of security and safety- both the liberal rights; On the
other hand, it functions through complex mechanisms of disciplinary normalization.
Imprisonment (as a way to repress) operates through the scientific calculation in order to
normalize, differentiate, hierarchize, and make a division between those who are the first degree
citizens in terms of respecting the rules and those who are excluded.
Liberalism, as the mentality of rules, creates an atmosphere in which market, civil
society, and citizens have their own logic and intrinsic mechanisms of self- regulation. In this
system of governing, sovereign tries to totalize its will across the national space (Burchell,
1991). However, rulers, on the one hand, confront with subjects who have rights and interest that
should not be interdicted by politics and, on the other hand, they faced with the situation in
which they cannot govern by the exercise of sovereign will because they do not have the
prerequisite knowledge and capacities (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). So, they need to
reformulate the objects, instrument, and tasks of rule based on the market, civil society and
citizenship aiming to ensure that they serve the national as a whole and function to benefit it
(Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013).
However, discipline and bio-power- apparently illiberal- finally found their places within
liberal mentalities of rule. These rules become practicable and understandable as a prerequisite
condition for production and governing free citizens (Foucault, 2012). Disciplinary logic
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operates through mechanisms in prison aimed to produce subjective conditions, self-control, selfmastery, and self-regulation to govern free and civilized citizens.
On the other hand, bio-political strategies, including censuses, statistical inquiries,
reproduction control, and health programs, provide the related laws that liberal government must
know and respect. That said, the legitimate government is not arbitrary, but it is based on the
policies which are necessary for the wellbeing enhancement of those whose interests are
mandatory to respect (Foucault, 1980a). These laws function through the good amount of
knowledge of the areas that should be ruled, such as prison, family, economy, community.
Liberalism tries to invest in the subjects of government. It means that in politics, law,
morality and so forth, subjects are individuals whose freedom, rights and liberty are to be
respected by setting limits to the legitimate political and legal regulation to regulate the particular
and new type of individuality (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). Thus, the liberal strategy behind
prisons is not to regulate individuals, but they are seeking to create individuals who do not need
to be governed by others and be able to be governed, mastered and cared by themselves.
In liberalism, the abstract subject of right takes a “universalistic” form (Barry, Osborne,
& Rose, 2013). Or, as Marx (1843) asserts, liberalism is trying to eradicate the intrinsic
distinctions of individuals under the shadow of abstract citizenship. Marx (1843) argues that
these liberal rights and liberty, are nothing except the right of separation from others, the rights
of self- interest, and all individuals are treated equally in the liberalism if they become isolated
and severing. Thus, the liberal constitutional state is built upon depoliticized inegalitarian social
powers and naturalizing egoistic civil society and rights are the form for securing and
legitimizing these tendencies (Brown, 1995).
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The solution of Marx (1843) for depoliticized human beings and their isolation because
of the liberal notions of rights and freedom is “every emancipation is a restoration of the human
world and of human relationships to man himself. Political emancipation is a reduction of man,
on the one hand to a member of civil society, an independent and egoistic individual, and on the
other hand, to a citizen, to a moral person” (p. 46).
The liberal policies contribute both directly and indirectly to the carceral state. First, in
the way that liberalism identifies the rights and second by its economic strategies. However,
these two ways are integrated.
The importance of these liberal notions of rights will be evident when we think how
these rights are defined and whom they serve. Let us talk about the property right, for example,
and its effects on racial minorities, poor, and people who are historically marginalized and the
way these rights expand the carceral state. The rise of capitalism, the accumulation of wealth, the
development of the bourgeois class determined many acts as illegal and criminal. These new
areas of criminality tended to secure and maintain the capital, property, and wealth in the hand of
the dominant, powerful, and capitalist class. This tendency requires the state to provide a safe
place for upper and middle-class whites to maintain their properties, which result in the
imprisonment for those who violate these liberal rights.
On the other hand, liberalism can indirectly expand the carceral state by its economic and
political principles. For example, the free market intensifies inequality to the extent that as those
who are in the very top socio-economic status accumulate more wealth, those who are deprived
of the resources tend to live in the urban, suburban area, and in general in streets. Since they
work more hours for less wage, benefit, and security, they seek alternatives to pay for their living
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expenses. This situation is the basis for the first way that liberalism defines the rights. Thus,
cleaning the streets of criminals serves the upper and middle-class interests to make and maintain
their capital. Also, attracting local and foreign investment is a principle in a liberal and neoliberal
economy which requires a “safe” place for an investment of companies. However, the way that
liberalism handles this situation is situated in an intensified “individualism”. Individuals are selfregulated, self-controlled, and responsible for their action. As Margaret Thatcher (1978)- Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990- states, “rising crime is not due to “society”
but to the steady undermining of personal responsibility and self-discipline”.
In liberalism, everyone has an equal right without considering race, class, gender,
religion, age, etc. Throughout this system, disciplines specify subjects not based on their inherent
characteristics but based on the certain norms of civilization and divide subjects to a civilized
member of society and those who fail to exercise their citizenship responsibility. Thus, in liberal
governmentalities, the purpose is that free individuals fulfill the voluntarily assumed obligations
to make their existence by conducting life responsibility (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). On the
other hand, must make their decisions about their self-regulation and self- control surrounded by
a web of norms and normativities.
(make this part separe) As I illustrated before natural rights are universal in the sense that
human rights can be applied on all human beings regardless of their intrinsic human
characteristics. This notion of rights is fundamental for the foundation of liberalism where rights
of citizens are distinct from the actual right of a man seeking to internalize and volunteer
obligations and switch responsibility form state to individuals.

58

What are the correctional policies for individuals who fail to be self- regulated, selfcontrolled, or fail to be self-realized in order to restore them to society as normal citizens who
function properly according to the liberalism’s value and goals? Besides other disciplinary
mechanisms to keeping citizen in the flow of making profit such as school, hospitals, and the
intensified surveillance in the every corner of streets, workplace, etc, one of the policies that
ensures that people who fail to fulfill the tendency of liberal disciplinary power to make selfregulated individuals, is through imprisonment as a tool for correction. As I illustrated in the
second chapter, the first reforms that led to the production of the prison originated from the
efforts of religious leaders toward spiritual cleansing. This purpose of imprisonment has turned
at the rise of capitalism into correcting prisoners as the effort to make them productive human
binges. This goal of imprisonment is argued by Bentham and his suggestion about the
panopticon prison. The architecture of panopticon is designed to work on inmate souls in order to
turn them to efficient workers. All the prison mechanism functions through a timetable to make
inmates again efficient and productive citizens.
Furthermore, the universalistic characteristic of liberal rights is paradoxical. Adorno
(2006) shows a theoretical paradox of universal perspectives toward progressive rationality in
which the universal aspects turn into the particular aspects which causes us who are likewise
particular, to anguish. The dominant universality can no longer mean history or any positive
value (Adorno, 2006). However, any form of consciousness is highly reluctant to admit that its
assumed supremacy of objective power over human beings who are confident that they are in the
full possession of self, is only a function of the universal (Adorno, 2006). So, our immediate
sense or experience implies that what happens to us is universal, and there is nothing particular
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with our experiences. For example, if someone fails to find a job, or being ignored or
discriminated, our immediate thought would be we are in full possession of our life and future.
The paradox appears where science, with its magical tools, shows us whatever happens to
us is not universal, and it is all about us. There is nothing universal, and all happenings are the
result of spontaneous individuality. Universality is a metaphysical and abstract thing which does
not exist in actual life (Adorno, 2006).
How can we apply these arguments in the current phenomenon of rights claims and its
role on the carceral state? Using Foucault and Adorno’s arguments to the question of this study,
as I argued before, the disciplinary power - the foundation of the capitalist industrial society- is
founded based on the scientific and clinical knowledge which is best suited to liberalism. The
rights discourse in a liberal society is defined as the universal and inalienable rights which
individuals have regardless of time, space, or their intrinsic features such as race, age, gender.
These notions of rights has a paradoxical nature in the sense that, although they claim to be
universal and a mechanism toward emancipation and even as individuals assume to have them
regardless of their differences and conceive them as their first and immediate experiences – the
universality creates a false consciousness in individuals. In actual life the disciplinary power
which is seeking to normalize individuals tries to internalize certain obligations into the citizens
and make them self-regulated, self- controlled and responsible for what happens in their lives or
in short as Adorno (2006) states make everything particular and completely individual.
Now we can see how this notion of rights functions through the criminal justice system in
a liberal society. Historically, and especially after the civil right movements in the US, the
human rights assumed to be universal with a sacred focus on equality for the different races,
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religions, genders, and ages leads individuals to believe and assume that they are in a full
possession and domination of their lives and nature. But what happens in actual life or in the
current criminal justice system is the fact that the liberal disciplinary power considers all
individuals and especially prisoners or those who violate social norms to be responsible for their
actions. Here is where the universal feature of rights can be paradoxical. These liberal policies
are exist in different contexts and eras in contemporary liberal societies and apply to prisoners,
addicts, students, or patients.
Here, we can see why Marx (1843) criticizes the notion of universalism when the actual
human being is eradicated in society and becomes an abstract citizen. When we are talking about
the rights, we are talking about justice, freedom, and equality that are all universal concepts. But,
in reality, what we have is intensified individuality. As I illustrated, the prison population in the
US is disproportionately occupied by young, poor black men. This disproportionate amount is
because of many liberal social and economic policies, which eventually impose many challenges
in the minorities lives.
The policies like War on Drug or Three Strike in California state are the examples of that
in that these policies presupposed African- American responsible for the violation of the norms
through the disciplinary mechanism and techniques like efficient litigation, prosecution, policing,
and all other disciplinary institutions (school-to-prison pipelines, etc.). So, all these institutions
are not at work to ensure universal human rights, but rather to normalized and self-regulate
individuals in categorical ways.
In summary, discipline, through its complicated institutions and based on universal
norms, tries to normalize individuals. For example, through psychiatrists, prosecutors, police,
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therapists, and some universal instructions toward a better, efficient and more productive life,
tries to internalize that the deviance, mental disorder, or crime are individual or personal
problems which should be solved by these universal institutions. Therefore, the purpose of
discipline is not to create a particularism that defends the actual rights of man. It neither aims to
recognize all the intrinsic human differences nor different social circumstances. Instead, it seeks
to specify, particularize individuals in a society based on their variation of following the rules
and respecting citizen’s obligations.

Rationality and Carceral State
As I illustrated in the second chapter, rationality defines as the degree to the action that is
happening as an outcome of quantitative and proper calculations (Weber, 1987). Rationality
leads to irrational consequences through a variety of bureaucratic institutions and organizations.
Further, as Adorno (2006) states “the growth of rationality is something like the growing ability
of the human species to preserve itself or, as we may also say, the growth in the universal
principle of the human self” (p. 16). One of these universal principles of the human self in our
age is rights and the way these rights are defined universally. For example, we can see how the
rights in the US constitution or other countries are more or less identical and also the national
wide feature of them can be considered universal in the sense that they can apply in many people
from different social background. So, natural rights and after that, liberal rights have universal
validity to the extent that everyone has these rights regardless of any particular time, space, race,
gender, age, and other intrinsic characteristics.
The emergence of irrationality, according to Weber (1993) is the result of increased
rationality which traps individuals in rational calculation and control called the “Iron Cage,”
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which repress natural human feelings and their aspirations. Also, Adorno (2006) argues that
irrationality is the product of manipulation, which has always appeared in the service of rational
or irrational domination and the growth of the techniques of rational domination.
The question is how rationality- rooted in reason- by its inherent mechanisms, produced
irrational consequences and, in this case, mass incarceration. To answer this question, I argue
that rationality can develop mass incarceration in two ways; first, as a foundation of the modern
judicial and legal system and second, as a means for exclusion and making “others”.
As I discussed before, the emergence of prison at its beginning was not the result of
reforms and humane efforts of reformers. It was the result of the distribution of power within the
judicial system and its institutions. So, the prison institutions built upon a complex bureaucratic
system which tried to make the punishment efficient, more calculatable, optimal, or as Foucault
(2012) states it emerged as “economic rationality”.
The new system of punishment was the part of the whole great institutional
transformation. Therefore, the general, explicit, and unified codes and rules of procedure, the
universal adaption of the jury system, the calculated crime and punishments occurred within the
transformation of the political economy of the state (Foucault, 2012). Thus, as Foucault (1989)
argues, liberalism is not an ideology, a theory, a juridical philosophy of individual freedom, or a
particular form of policies applied by state. Liberalism is nothing but the rationality that
functions as the particular methods and principles to rationalize state practices.
Further, the notion of the carceral state is not only about the criminal justice system, but
all state institutions, policies, and personnel become a part of the carceral state when for example
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they require exclusion based on the criminal history of individuals, exclusion for education
loans, assigning criminal justice personel to regulating and disciplinary practices. All these
interventions are about state institutions and formal law, but the disciplinary mechanisms can
expand within a society when observation, surveillance, measurement move through schools,
factories, families, hospitals, and workplaces (Murakawa, 2014).
The bureaucratic systems of juridical power in a liberal society are assumed to be
universal in the sense that all the judicial system and its mechanisms function through universal
norms and techniques from the prisons to probation services, police, and courts. These
techniques are universal because they oppose homogenous norms and are based on the universal
scientific principles such as psychology, economy, and law. All these institutions and their
administrations are trying to normalize individuals based on this universal rationality and divide
them based on the degree they obey the universal norms. As Weber (1993) argues, the increased
rationality eventually traps individuals into the iron cage, which I argue that in the given study
can be interpreted as the prison. To put it differently, as Adorno (2006) states “where human
beings strive to internalize the universal, the very thing that should harmonize with their reason,
they almost always act irrationally” (p. 72).
The criminal justice system of the US, is entirely a bureaucratic system. The police
investigation, litigations, court hearings, appealing, and all the prison guards and its architecture
try to increase the efficiency within the system, distribute the power and calculate the crime and
punishment based on the new scientific knowledge. The rationality and calculation-based
techniques and policies are not limited to the criminal justice system. It is widespread among all
the state’s practices, all of which culminate in the carceral state. For instance, as I argued in the
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first chapter, one of the reasons for prison expansion is the need for white employment/labor in
rural areas, leading white guards to be employed in the rural areas, policing populataions marked
as urban, racialized, and surplus in the US or War on Poverty policies and its afterward protests
that eventually rationalized other regulations regarding War on Drug that target mostly AfricanAmerican and poor.
Further, as discussed before, rationalization contributes to the expansion of prison by
excluding “others”. As I illustrated in the second chapter of this study, the disciplinary
normalization divides individuals to normal and abnormal, people who respect the defined
models and norms and those who violate them- the division between rationality as a form of truth
and unreason as an ultimate form of madness (abnormality) (Foucault, 2012).
Universal liberal rights which are embedded in liberalism functions based on this
division. That is to say; liberalism defines individuals as the subjects of a set of rules and social
citizenship appropriate to a bourgeois political and economic culture. Therefore, being rational or
reasonable is the foundation of exclusion and division in society. Rational individuals are the
basis of rationalizing government activities in the sense that rational activities of state must be
intrinsically connected to free and privately motivated conduct of individuals because the
rationality of these individual’s conduct is what enables the market to function optimally
(Burchell, 1991).
In this situation, individuals become expert of themselves and adopt an educated and
knowledgeable relation of self-care in respect of their bodies, their minds and their form of
conduct (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). That requires individuals to accept and be expert for
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being responsible for their current and future risks. Social works, privatizing counseling, and
self-help strategies are all techniques that individuals should apply to achieve happiness.
This new configuration has its own exclusion and complexities; the reproduction of new
psychological techniques and languages of empowerment of those who coded as “excluded” and
“marginalized”. Disadvantaged individuals have come to be seen as potentially and ideally an
active agent in the fabrication of their own existence. Their exclusion from the benefits of selffulfillment and life of choice are no longer considered as the support for social determination, but
they are considered as people whose self-steams, self-responsibility, and self-fulfilling are
destroyed and deformed by the dependency culture and learned helplessness (Barry, Osborne, &
Rose, 2013). The solution that liberalism offers to these excluded individuals is through their
engagement in the varieties of programs like skills of self-promotion, counseling to reform the
sense of self- worth, and programs to enable them to find their rightful place “as the selfactualizing and demanding subjects of an "advanced" liberal democracy” (p. 59).
As I illustrate, disciplinary power tries to normalize individuals. It does so through the
objectification of criminals, which eventually leads to the exclusion of them from the dominant
discourse of rights and the whole society. The criminal becomes the enemy of all in the sense
that it will be in the interest of all to push her outside the pact, disqualify him as a citizen,
recognize her as a wild fragment of nature, identify him as a monster, villain, a madman, and in
general “abnormal” individuals. Here is where s/he becomes the subject of scientific experiences
and the target for correction and “treatment” (Foucault, 2012).
One of these marginalized group which historically have been considered as “others” are
racial minorities in the US and especially African- American which- as I discussed- occupied the
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prisons disproportionately. Mass- incarceration is linked with the history of racial discrimination
and slavery in the United States. The civil rights movements were the efforts toward diminishing
racial discrimination against African-Americans. However, almost six decades later, the United
States is struggling with racial discrimination and disparities in prisons. Many scholars
(Williams, 1987) believe that the way of freedom for blacks is crossing from the right claims and
making an effort toward changes within the established structure of liberalism and its abstract
rights. For example, the slavery clause in the 13thAmendment to the United States Constitution
is considered as the way to facilitate the mass incarceration of African-American. This
Amendment states that “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction”. However, I argue that the problem of mass incarceration
will not be solved by removing this clause from the Amendment; instead, we are only
underestimating this complex phenomenon. The problem cannot be solved within the framework
of liberal rights and without considering all the structural conditions behind carceral states. This
clause is a tiny part of the complex network of the economic rationality of punishment and in
general the rationality of government.
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CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS
Right Claims have always been assumed to be a mechanism for the emancipation of
individuals who historically have been marginalized, excluded, and stigmatized, to rid societies
of the oppressive conditions imposed upon them based on their class, gender, race, religion, and
age. Rights and reforms are also supposed to limit and control the state power. Rights claims
and liberal movements, also, are assumed as protection for individuals from being subjects of
violence both by the state and other people. Rights claims and reforms are of importance toward
the emergence and production of imprisonment, claiming to reform the inhumane corporal and
harsh punishments and to create a humane punishment which is not directly applied to the body
of the convicts.
However, as this study shows, rights claims and reforms are not separated from the whole
agenda of the state’s distribution of power not only within the judicial system but also in the
whole of society. Disciplinary power, through its sophisticated techniques and mechanisms and
based on the scientific knowledge and tools such as policing, psychology, and especially in rights
discourse, tries to normalize individuals in order to divide individuals into two categories;
normal and abnormal, on more precisely prisoners and not prisoner, madman and rational human
beings etc.
This whole bureaucratic system, or as Foucault (2012) calls it "economic rationality",
seeks to maximize the efficiency in both the state branches and individual’s life through defining
the new notion of responsibility and making everyone the active agent of his failure or success.
The rationalization of the state depends on the rationality of governed, people whose selffulfillment, and self- realization help the state to be legitimate and reach its goals.
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Liberal natural rights operate in order to fulfill these political and economic tendencies of
liberalism. They do so by making individuals abstract, isolated, depoliticized citizens. In sum,
liberal rights try to make a homogenous society of separate individuals in which everyone has
the rights regardless of their different intrinsic characteristics. And this denial promotes
inequality under the law and state.

This research aims to offer a full and detailed understanding of how liberal movements
and reforms, in the long run, have contributed to the increase of prisons and the development of
the carceral state; by tracing rights discourse regarding incarceration, from the first case
involving movements toward the production of prison as a humane alternative for corporal
punishments in the eighteenth century to the more recent case such as the civil rights movements
of the 1940s and early 1960s.
My research helps to trace the process of the development of liberal rights, which I argue
are the essence of rationality that has brought by itself the complex and intense bureaucracy. This
complex system has led to irrational consequences. Mass incarceration is one of these irrational
consequences. To articulate and find the connections between rights claims, liberalism,
rationality, and imprisonment, I tried to analyze genealogically the way that reforms and rights
claims make the prisons increase. They not only do not make any progressive step toward
emancipation, but also eventually contribute to more exclusion, marginalization, and
consequently mass incarceration.
In the debate leading up to the role of liberalism and neoliberalism to mass incarceration,
several scholars made arguments for or against the idea that right claims function in different
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ways. Murakawa (2014) asserts that the liberal notion of race-neutral agenda and racial violence
policies of law-makers contributes to the development of the carceral state. Murakawa (2014)
tries to draw how the different liberal policies in the US expand the carceral state. The difference
between Murakawa’s study and this study is about the methodology he used and also the way I
theoretically address the issue of mass incarceration. He tries to analyze specifically the social,
economic, and political policies, which led to the development of prison more empirically and
show how these policies directly or indirectly affected incarceration in the US. However, my
study tries to give the readers a comprehensive foundation of the role of liberal ideologies-such
as universal liberal rights, the new notion of responsibility, and intensified individualityultimately expand the carceral state. Besides, this study aims to critique these well-established
notions and institutions in a genealogical though reconsidering whether the creation of the prison
at the first place and after that the universal and liberal rights as a progressive step in human
beings history.
Furthermore, this study has borrowed many critical ideas from the works of Brown
(1995) in respect to the understanding of how rights can be paradoxical in contrast to what they
are claimed to be an emancipatory force and the role of the liberal and neoliberal state on
marginalizing, excluding people especially racial minorities. Brown’s (1995) main
concentrations are on how the sexual and gender role are defined by neoliberal legal and political
power. However, much less work has been done to identify how right’s paradox is bound up with
the role of liberal movements in expanding the carceral states.
My research also contributes to knowledge due to its unique methodology (genealogy and
the critical theory) by which I could analyze the dominant right discourses and found out how
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these discourses affect the formation of prison and prison’s development over time. I think
finding the similarities between these two methodologies (genealogy and critical theory) is of
importance. Allen (2016) did a great job to define how these two methodologies relate to each
other, especially the work of Adorno and Foucalt in terms of the notion of problematization and
progress. However, this study tries to develop the notion of how liberalism affects the way we
think and disable individuals to think critically and assume all well-established notions and
institution something pre-determined and inevitable. This research wants to question this idea
through genealogical and critical theory in order to show how these notions are questionable,
such as rights, reforms, and progress. There are plenty of rooms for future work in these areas,
especially about their theories in universality, rights, and state. This research tries to discover
some of these theoretical connections.
This study has tried to diagnose the problem of mass incarceration in terms of the role
that liberal rights and reforms have played and still playing in the prison expansion. The
genealogical and the critical theory which has been used in the study and also the theoretical
discussions which are used made me think about the alternatives which can be used instead on
the universal law toward freedom, equality and in general emancipation. The following
alternatives may seem not to be feasible in the era of domination of “liberal virus” (Amin, 2019),
neoliberal, and capitalist society, which has affected all domains of human being’s lives and all
around the world. This system is assumed to be the “eternal truth,” and the “truths of reason” and
the best possible world that we can live wich make us disable to critique the world has
surrounded us. This idea has been dominated, especially after the collapse of the alternative
socialist experiments in China and the Soviet Union (Amin, 2019). However, as Amin (2019)
states, these ideas of liberalism are founded on the ideological and para-theoretical principles.
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Having said that, it is worth to talk and think about the structural and radical
transformations that some sociologists have introduced to us (Marx,1843, Foucault, 1980a, &
Arendt 2006).
One of the alternatives is argued by Marx (1843) in response to Bauer (1843) who argues
that the political emancipation of Jewish would be achieved when the Cristian state turn into a
secular state and on the other hand Jewish peoples themselves relinquish their religiosity. Marx
(1843) states that the solution is not to eradicate the religion both from the state and individual’s
domain, we should eradicate the historical, social condition in which religion has emerged. In
facts, as long as both Jewish people and Christians do not understand what they respect and
consider as religious privilege is only the different development stages on the human mind, we
cannot talk about freedom and emancipation for individuals.
Using these arguments to the problem of mass- incarceration, we can say that liberal
notion of rights, freedom, and equality have nothing to do with the problem in hand; These
notions were the result of the specific social, economic, and political events and the different
stages of human mind development that should be questioned from their beginning. The social,
economic, and cultural conditions which resulted in the issue – the possibility of prisons and the
necessity of liberal rights - should be eradicated in order to get rid of or devalue the notions that
we assume today are valuable and progressive such as prison reforms, liberal rights.
Furthermore, the alternative justice or power, in opposition to the existing neoliberal
power and criminal justice system, can help eradicate mass incarceration. However, as Foucault
(1980a) states, it is right that we can have alternative power, but as long as we are going to solve
the problems through courts, litigations, and in general through all the established mechanism of
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state and the bourgeois ideology to archives the rights and freedom we are not practicing
alternative power. In we want to practice in this way we must play according to the rules of the
judicial system. So, it would be impossible to have a counter-justice as the judicial system
operate as a state apparatus. The counter justice would be possible when a man in the usual case
of events be able to get away from the consequences of his action such as seizing, bring him
before a court, persuade a judge, and sentencing.
Arendt and Kohn (2006) argue, although it would be hard to imagine that individuals can
be free without sovereignty, the freedom can be achieved when the people renounce the state.
Although it would be hard to think about freedom without sovereignty in the traditional
philosophy, it is as dangerous as to believe that human beings are only free if they are sovereign.
The sovereignty of political bodies always has been an illusion which can be achieved only by
violence and repression and trough non- political tools. Sovereignty and freedom cannot be
together at the same time in the sense that when individuals want to be sovereign, they actually
must to practice oppression of will. Also, as Marx (1843) states, states paly an intermediary role
between individuals and their general human emancipation.
This research opens the room for future works in different areas. One of the crucial
situations which needs to be studied regarding the role of liberal rights is the issue of immigrant
rights. The importance of these types of studies about immigration is evident especially these
days with the concentration camps all over the world from Autralia, France, and the United
States, and also the recent mass shouting targeted immigrants in El Paso, Texas, and Dayton,
Ohio on August 5 and 6, 2019.
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The rights of immigrants are important in two ways. First, immigration itself is
considered as a crime, treated by criminal law, are considered as a violation of citizens rights,
and the rights of sovereignty. Second, immigrants have disproportionately occupied the prisons
in the US and some other host countries like the United Kingdom (Aas & Bosworth, 2013).
The relationship between state and citizens and the way individuals delegate their rights
to the sovereignty to regulate them and consequently protect them from outsiders and serve the
will of people has been argued by Foucault (2003). Thus, the liberal or the neoliberal state offers
the universalistic rights to abstract citizens within the national borders in response to the duty
and responsibility that individuals have as citizens. In other words, individuals and state interests
are considered to be intertwined and integrated. These rights, such as the right to citizenship, are
exclusive in nature, try to differentiate, categorize, and hierarchize individuals and categorize
them in terms of who is a citizen and who is not. Therefore, more theoretical work should be
done to illustrate the paradox of rights not only regarding people who have been historically
marginalized and excluded, but also the paradoxical nature of liberal rights in general and the
way they try to intensify individuality, isolate and separate form from the society.
The theoretical analysis of this study also can be used to illustrate to what extent the other
social movements such as environmental movements, gay movements, or feminism movements
have contributed to the emancipation. The Liberal reforms like these movements and their actual
consequences should be reconsidered in terms of evaluation of their claimed “progressive” steps
toward freedom and equality.
Further, a genealogical study is useful in these areas in order to question the process that
the well-established institutions and notions have received authority. Also, the theoretical
background which has been developed in this research can be used to critique the rationality
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behind these institutions like immigration rights, criminal law, policing and surveillance in
borders or schools, workplaces, etc.
Finally, this study can help future work both in a methodological way- genealogical and
critical theory- and theoretical analysis which has been developed through the study. I hope this
research could provide even a small room toward diagnosing social issues, especially in areas
that historically have been considered as progress and reform.
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